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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 200403 83-CA

vs.
RAYMOND LEE NORCUTT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
-kick*

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) and 78-2-2(4).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Norcutt was denied his statutory and constitutional right to a preliminary

hearing? Norcutt asserts that this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact and
should be reviewed for correctness. State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ^[ 18, 40 P.3d 611. This
issue was preserved below in Norcutt's Motion to Continue Trial and Preliminary
Hearing and at trial in his motion for mistrial (R. 202-205; R. 423: 39).
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule

404(b), by admitting evidence that Norcutt, several years prior to this alleged offense, had
in his possession a notebook containing methamphetamine recipes? This Court reviews

trial court determinations regarding the admissibility of other crimes evidence or prior
bad acts for abuse of discretion. State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, If 11, 72 P.3d
127. This issue was preserved below in Norcutt's Motion in Limine and at trial (R. 30003; R. 422: 5-11).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Raymond Lee Norcutt appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of
the Eighth District Court after being convicted of clandestine laboratory precursors
and/or equipment, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4
and58-37d-5.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Raymond Lee Norcutt was charged by information filed in the Eighth Judicial
District Court on or about October 25, 2001, with clandestine laboratory precursors
and/or equipment, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4
and58-37d-5(R.2-3).
On January 15, 2002, Lance Dean entered his notice of appearance of counsel (R.
12-13). Norcutt waived his right to a preliminary hearing on June 26, 2002 (R. 73).

On December 26, 2002, Justin C. Bond entered his notice of appearance of
counsel on behalf of Norcutt (R. 88).
On December 31, 2002, Norcutt filed a Motion for Continuance, requesting the
trial court to continue his trial in order to hire attorney Mike Esplin and allow him time to
prepare for trial (R. 98). The trial court denied the request for continuance (R. 101).
On January 27, 2003, Mike Esplin entered his notice of appearance of counsel in
behalf of Norcutt (R. 147).
On May 22, 2003, Norcutt filed a Demand for Date Time and Place of the Offense
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-14-1 (R. 149, 154). On May 29, 3003, the State
filed a Response to Defendant's Demand for Date Time and Place of Offense, changing
and enlarging the date of offense from on or about September 26, 2001, to be between
January 1, 2001 and September 26, 2001 (R. 3, 166).
On June 3, Norcutt filed a Notice of Alibi Defense pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 77-14-1 (R. 193). Norcutt asserted that he was not in the State of Utah on
the date alleged in the Information (R. 192-93).
On June 3, 2003, Norcutt filed a Motion in Limine, requesting the trial court to
prevent the State from introducing any evidence of alleged criminal conduct on the part
of Norcutt which is alleged to occur prior to September 26, 2001 (R. 191, 210). The
basis for the motion was that the State failed to provide Norcutt with information alleging
any illegal conduct prior to June 2, 2003, two weeks prior to the scheduled trial for June
16, 2003 (R. 190). Norcutt filed an alibi defense which defends against the allegations

set forth in the Information, but asserted he was unable to investigate and prepare a
defense against the dates which are outside the notice given in the Information (R. 190).
On June 5, 2003, Norcutt filed a Motion to Continue Trial and For Preliminary
Hearing (R. 202-205). Norcutt asserted that the nine month expansion of time during
which the offense is alleged to have been committed constitutes a major deviation from
the alleged date in the Information and he would have insufficient time to defend himself
against the expanded time of offense alleged (R. 203-04). Norcutt further asserted that he
would not have waived his right to a preliminary hearing if he knew the State was going
to change its position two weeks prior to trial by expanding the sole date of alleged
offense to a nine month period of time for the alleged offense (R. 203-04). Norcutt
asserted that the material change of date of alleged offense in the Information made his
waiver ineffective and void (R. 203).
On June 5, 2003, Norcutt also filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that instead of
narrowing the alleged date of offense as required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-14-1, the
State expanded the alleged date of offense to be between January 1, 2001 and September
26, 2001 (R. 211-15). Norcutt asserted that this amounted to an amendment of the
Information which was impermissible this close to the trial date since the amendment
would unfairly prejudice him (R. 212-15).
On the June 6, 2003, the State filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss,
contending it had not filed an Amended Information and that the State was not required
to prove a specific time and place that the laboratory equipment was possessed, so
enlarging the time for the alleged offense was not prejudicial to Norcutt (R. 217-19).

On June 11, 2003, the State filed its Response to Motion in Limine, contending
that it should not be constrained to limit its evidence regarding possession to a specific
moment in time since possession includes ownership, control, etc., and is not limited to
immediate control at all times (R. 224-35).
On November 25, 2003, Norcutt filed a Motion in Limine to exclude the testimony
of Terry Vincent, a trooper with the Wyoming Highway Patrol, asserting that the notice
of intent to call Vincent was untimely, being faxed to Defense Counsel's office at 4:08
p.m. on Friday, November 21, 2003 (R. 295-98, 300-03). Defense Counsel did not see
the notice until Monday afternoon, November 24, 2003 (R. 297). Norcutt also asserted
that the testimony would violate Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(R. 295-96).
On December 1, 2003, the State filed its Response to Motion in Limine dated
November 25, 2003, contending that the Notice was 10 days prior to trial and that the
evidence is proof of a person's "intent, preparation, plan, (or) knowledge" under Rule
404(b) and is not unfairly prejudicial (R. 304-07).
Jury trial was held on December 1 and 2, 2003 (R. 339, 422, 423). The jury
returned a verdict of guilty of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment, a first
degree felony, as charged in the complaint (R. 341, 344). The jury also found that the
possession of the clandestine laboratory did not occur in conjunction with producing any
amount of a controlled substance, but the jury did find that it was located within 500 feet
of a residence (R. 341, 345, 346).

On April 27, 2004, Norcutt was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison for his conviction of
clandestine laboratory precursors (R. 389).
On May 13, 2004, Norcutt filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the judgment,
sentence, and commitment in this case (R. 397). The Utah Supreme Court assigned this
case to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 403).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of Wayne Hollebeke
- Detective Wayne Hollebeke works for the Uintah County Sheriffs Office and on
September 26, 2001 around 5:00 p.m., he participated in executing a search warrant on
the residence of Lindsay Hale and Raymond Norcutt (R. 422: 75-77). Hollebeke had
received information from an informant, Stephanie Davies, that drug paraphernalia and a
drug lab were located at the residence and inside a converted Greyhound bus located on
the property (R. 422: 76-77, 80, 115). After obtaining a search warrant, Hollebeke and
others searched the residence and the bus (R. 422: 81-83). The search lasted the whole
night and Hollebeke did not leave until about 9:00 a.m. the next morning (R. 422: 115).
State's Exhibit #1 contained a list of items found in or near the bus, including
glassware, chemicals, and other items necessary to manufacture methamphetamine (R.
422: 85, 89). State's Exhibit #2 contained items found in the house, including drug
paraphernalia and other items associated with a clandestine laboratory (R. 422: 89, 94).
Hollebeke stated that no solvent wTas found in Hale5 house (R. 423: 91).

Items seized from the bus were tested for fingerprints (R. 422: 94-95). Hollebeke
testified he was not an expert on fingerprint identification and did not have the expertise
to identify any of the fingerprints found (R. 422: 96-98). Hollebeke learned from the
crime lab that the prints did not match Norcutt (R. 422: 132). Although several items
were tested and several prints were lifted, Hollebeke only had Norcutt's prints tested to
see if they matched the prints on the items seized (R. 422: 130-32). No other prints were
tested, even though Hollebeke was aware that Hale's husband, Wayne Hale, had been
convicted for possessing a clandestine lab (R. 422: 117, 132). Hollebeke also observed
that the name Gayland Guru was found on Exhibit 8 (R. 423: 92). However, Hollebeke
never investigated the name and did not have fingerprints checked on this name (R. 423:
92-93).
Hollebeke interviewed Hale three different times (R. 422: 111). Hale was not
present when the officers first executed the warrant, but she showed up some time later
(R. 422: 91). Hollebeke noticed she was upset and briefly interviewed her (R. 422: 91,
111). During the first interview which was conducted during the execution of the search
warrant at around 9:21 p.m., Hollebeke informed Hale that they had found contraband in
her residence (R. 422: 111). At no point did Hale implicate Norcutt, nor did she say that
the items being seized in the bus belonged to Norcutt (R. 422: 114).
At some point following the first brief interview, Hale was arrested (R. 422: 114).
Hale was charged with possession of a clandestine lab and precursors as well as
possession of paraphernalia (R. 422: 114-15). Hollebeke then conducted a second and
lengthy interview with Hale at jail on September 27, 2001 (R. 422: 116). Hale admitted

that the clandestine lab equipment was not originally in the bus but she moved them to
the bus (R. 422: 121). Hale further admitted to Davis that she had attempted to cook
methamphetamine with the equipment (R. 422: 123, 124). Hale stated that the stuff was
not hers and that it belonged to Ray Norcutt (R. 422: 123).
After the interview, Hale was taken back to search the bus (R. 422: 124). The
residence was not searched again (R. 422: 124-25). Although the officers had thoroughly
searched the bus the previous day, Hale pointed out or told the officers where to find the
items in State's Exhibit #3, including smoking pipes, Ziplock bags, and Zig Zag papers
(R. 422: 100-02, 104, 125). One item, a marijuana smoking pipe, was hidden in the bus,
yet Hale knew exactly where it was (R. 422: 133). Hale stated that Norcutt did not
smoke marijuana, but she did (R. 422: 134).
A third interview was conducted on September 28, 2001 (R. 422: 127). Hale
stated that all the items found in the bus and around her house were Norcutt's (R. 422:
127). HoUebeke asked Hale if she would testify against Norcutt and Hale said, "As long
as I'm not charged for it" (R. 422: 129-30).
HoUebeke admitted that the only information they had connecting Norcutt with
ownership of the materials was all came for Hale (R. 422: 130).
Testimony of Bob Taylor
Bob Taylor is employed with the Vernal Police Department and he assisted with
the execution of the search warrant at Lindsay Hale's residence on September 26, 2001
(R. 422: 142). Taylor worked closely with HoUebeke and helped document the items
seized (R. 422: 149-50). Ta}ior, along with Officer Manning, "slowly search[ed] the

[bus]. It took a very longtime" (R. 422: 151). Taylor seized "many items" "consistent
with a methamphetamme laboratory" (R. 422: 152, 153-55). Taylor also found a large
cardboard box, State's Exhibit #11, that had several various items of glassware,
measuring devices and a plastic tubing (R. 422: 160). The box was sent and addressed to
Raymond Norcutt (R. 422: 160). All the equipment was disassembled and the lab was
not operating (R. 422: 186).
Taylor tested numerous items seized from the bus for fingerprints (R. 422: 177).
Taylor testified that was "proficient in recovering fingerprints" and thus, he "was able to
recover a number of prints from various items" (R. 422: 178). Taylor testified that
fingerprints are helpful in determining who has been connected with the clandestine
laboratory equipment (R. 422: 195-96).
Taylor admitted that he did not find ephedrine, red phosphorous, or
pseudoephedrine, all essential ingredients to cooking methamphetamme (R. 422: 186-87,
192).
Exhibit #8 was a cooler that had a name on it, but no one checked out the name (R.
422: 185).
Before Taylor helped execute the search warrant, as he was conducting
surveillance near the residence and he could smell the distinct odor of solvent (R. 422:
182-83). Later that day, he helped execute the search warrant but he did not remember
smelling the solvent any more (R. 422: 184). Solvent is used in the cooking process (R.
422: 184). Taylor did not find any solvent during the search (R. 422: 184).

Taylor was with Hollebeke and Hale when they revisited the bus the day after the
initial search (R. 422: 202). Taylor testified that Hale retrieved all the items seized that
day (R. 422: 202). Taylor was also present during parts of interviews with Hale and Hale
stated that she had placed the items in the bus (R. 422: 204).
Testimony of Lindsay Hale
Lindsay Hale testified that she knew Raymond Norcutt and had lived with him
several years before the time of trial (R. 423: 6). Hale moved to Vernal, Utah in August,
2001 (R. 423: 10). Hale's home was searched in 2001 and as a result of that search, she
was arrested for possession of paraphernalia, marijuana distribution, and possession of a
clandestine lab (R. 423: 7). The day after the search, Hale admitted that she made a deal
that she would testify against Norcutt if she was not charged with the meth lab (R. 423:
19-20). Hale told Detective Hollebeke that she was willing to testify only if she was not
charged herself (R. 423: 20).
At trial, Hale testified that while Norcutt lived with her, he would leave town and
when he came back, he would have "some kind of new glassware, beaker or something,
and show me what he got" (R. 423: 10-11). This only happened "a couple times" (R.
423: 12). Norcutt would also show Hale some chemicals and told her that he wanted to
learn how to cook meth (R. 423: 13-14). Towards the end of the summer of 2001,
Norcutt allegedly "had a little lab set up on the kitchen" (R. 423: 15). Although Hale
used methamphetamine at that time, this made her upset because it was too close to her
children (R. 423: 15). Hale told Norcutt "to get it out o f the kitchen (R. 423: 15-26).
Hale was not sure where Norcutt put the lab equipment (R. 423: 16).

Hale admitted that she never saw Norcutt cooking meth, but he would give her
different products to try and would say, "Try this" (R. 423: 16). Norcutt would spend
some time in his bus and then would come in the house and have Hale try a "product" (R.
423: 16-17). Hale would try it, but said that it was no good (R. 423: 17).
A few weeks after Hale was arrested, she spoke with Norcutt while he was in jail
in Wyoming, and he told her not to say anything (R. 423: 17).
Hale acknowledged being interviewed on three separate occasions by the law
enforcement officers (R. 423: 20). During the first interview on September 26, 2002, she
did not say anything about Norcutt nor did allege that the items belonged to Norcutt (R.
423: 20). After spending the night in jail, she told the officers that she would testify
against Norcutt if they made a deal with her (R. 423: 21). However, Hale made no
mention of her allegation that Norcutt had shown her glassware or cooked meth in her
home during this interview (R. 423: 21).
During the interview on September 28, Hale told the officers that Norcutt never
cooked in the house (R. 423: 23). Hale testified, however, that she lied to the officers
about this statement (R. 423: 23-24).
Hale acknowledged that her husband was charged in Wyoming for possessing a
clandestine lab and that she was familiar with clandestine drug labs (R. 423: 25-26).
Hale also claimed that she allowed Norcutt to store boxes in her Cadillac just before he
went to jail (R. 423: 19). Hale stated that Norcutt could not store the boxes in his large
bus because it "was packed" (R. 423: 27). However, her Cadillac was being repossessed
so she moved the boxes to the bus (R. 423: 27). While moving the boxes, she opened

them and discovered "there was some glassware in there" (R. 423: 27). Hale testified
that she had never seen the glassware, despite her earlier testimony that Norcutt
occasionally showed her glassware (R. 423: 27). Hale claimed that "there was a lot of
glassware" and she had not seen those pieces before (R. 423: 27-28).
Hale stated that Norcutt was arrested on a misdemeanor in Wyoming and went to
jail sometime around August 13, 2001 (R. 423: 28).
Hale testified that she never saw a lab set up in the bus (R. 423: 29). Hale also
testified that she did not attempt to cook meth with this lab, but she admitted that she had
attempted to cook meth before (R. 423: 29).
Hale also admitted that she lied to the police when she told the she used marijuana
more than methamphetamines (R. 423: 30). In fact, Hale was a heavy user of
methamphetamines during the time her house was searched and she lied to the police
only to make herself look better at the time of the arrest (R. 423: 30). Hale further
admitted that she had been sanctioned for lying to her counselor in the drug rehab
program (R. 423:31-32).
Testimony of Troy Vincent
Troy Vincent is employed with the Wyoming Highway Patrol (R. 423: 61). On
March 13, 1998, Vincent stopped Norcutt in his bus and searched the vehicle 9R. 423:
62). During the search, he found a notebook containing various recipes for
manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 423: 62). However, no drugs or lab materials were
found in the bus (R. 423: 62).

Testimony of Wally Hendricks
Wally Hendricks is the chief deputy sheriff with the Duchesne County Sheriffs
Office and is specially trained to examine fingerprints (R. 423: 68). Hendricks received a
request from the Uintah County Sheriff to examine latent fingerprint samples and to
compare those samples with Norcutt's fingerprints (R. 423: 69). Hendricks testified that
"some of the latent prints were of sufficient quality to do a comparison" with Norcutt's
prints (R. 423: 69-70). Hendricks compared the prints and found no basis to indicate that
the prints he examined from the Uintah County Sheriff belonged to Norcutt (R. 423: 71;
Exhibit #'s 21, 22).
Testimony of Ron Lantz
Ron Lantz testified that he lives in Thermopolis, Wyoming, and that he met
Norcutt, Lindsay Hale and Wayne Hale in Wyoming (R. 423: 79-80, 81). Lantz was at
Hale's home at some point between August 13, 2001 and September 26, 2001 (R. 423:
80). While he was at Hale's home sometime in September, 2001, a repossession man
showed up to regain possession of a Cadillac and a Bronco (R. 423: 81, 87). Hale told
Lantz that she had "some personal stuff in the vehicles and asked him "Would you
please help me move my stuff out of these vehicles so the repo guy can take these
vehicles" (R. 423: 81, 85-86). Hale directed Lantz to unload some boxes and other
personal possessions and put them in the back of Norcutt's bus and in her house (R. 423:
81).
Hale then went through some of the boxes in her house and Lantz saw that some
of the boxes had glassware (R. 423: 82). Lantz specifically remembered seeing Exhibit

#'s 10 and 13, and these were items of glassware that Hale pulled out of the boxes that
were now in her house (R. 423: 82). Hale never mentioned that the glassware belonged
to Norcutt (R. 423: 83).
Testimony of Raymond Norcutt
Raymond Norcutt testified that he met Lindsay Hale in June, 2000 in Wyoming,
the day her husband was arrested (R. 423: 96). Hale left her husband approximately one
month before he was arrested (R. 423: 97). Norcutt and Hale began "going out" and
ended up moving to Utah (R. 423: 97).
Norcutt helped Hale move by driving her Bronco while she drove her Cadillac (R.
423: 97). Norcutt previously saw all the items listed in Exhibits #'s 14-18 in boxes in the
trunk of Hale's Cadillac in Wyoming (R. 423: 97-98). Norcutt thought these items were
foramethlab(R.423:98).
Norcutt lived in Vernal from October, 2000 until August 13, 2001 (R. 423: 99).
Norcutt went back to Wyoming to serve a six month sentence for a misdemeanor charge
concerning a non-drug conviction (R. 423: 99). Before he left to serve the sentence, he
packed up all his belongings and stored them in his bus (R. 423: 99). Norcutt did not
pack up any of the items in Exhibits #'s 4-18 since these did not belong to him (R. 423:
100). None of these items were in his bus when he left (R. 423: 100). Norcutt admitted
that he had used methamphetamine before (R. 423: 111).
Norcutt recalled that on Super Bowl Sunday, 2001, Hale brought in a box from her
Cadillac into her kitchen and looked through the glassware and then put it back in the car
(R. 423: 100-01, 108). Hale told Norcutt that the glassware was "stuff that police in

Thermopolis never - didn't get ahold [sic] of when her husband was arrested" (R. 423:
108). Hale also told Norcutt that she and her husband had cooked meth in Thermopolis,
Wyoming (R. 423: 108).
Norcutt testified that Exhibit #10, the box with his name on it, was a box with
VHS tapes shipped from his parents to him in 2000 (R. 423: 101-02). When he went to
serve the sentence in Wyoming, the box was in his bus and still had the VHS tapes in it
(R.423: 102).
When Norcutt got out of jail, Hale took him to get his bus (R. 423: 103). The bus
was not where he left it, but it was on someone else's property who he did not know (R.
423: 103). Hale told Norcutt that she sold his tools to pay for a lawyer (R. 423: 104).
Hale told Norcutt that she gave her step-dad his welder and gave his Toyota truck to a
person to pay rent (R. 423: 104). Norcutt had to file a lawsuit against Hale to recover his
damages (R.423: 105).
Norcutt explained that when he was pulled over in 1998 and was found with a
notebook containing methamphetamine recipes, he was moving from Arizona and was
carrying some of his sons' personal property (R. 423: 114-15). The police seized the
notebook along with three rifles (R. 423: 115). Norcutt went back to the police station to
retrieve the guns and they also gave him the notebook (R. 423: 115).
Testimony of Wayne Hale
Wayne Hale testified that he was arrested in Thermopolis, Wyoming for
possession of a clandestine methamphetamine lab (R. 423: 117). That charge was
dismissed, however, through plea negotiations and Wayne plead guilty instead to a

convicted felon with a firearm (R. 423: 119). Wayne admitted that he "dabbled" in
attempting to produce methamphetamine, but he was unsuccessful (R. 423: 120). Wayne
claimed that he only used a couple of beakers or glass tubes in his attempt to cook
methamphetamine (R. 423: 120). Wayne acknowledged that he set up a lab and tried to
make some product, but he did not know what he was doing (R. 423: 120). Wayne
asserted that the police only confiscated a couple of beakers when he was arrested
because that was all he had to set up the lab with (R. 423: 120-21). Wayne also asserted
that the glassware in Lindsay Hale's Cadillac was not his (R. 423: 117).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Norcutt asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a preliminary
hearing. Although Norcutt initially waived a preliminary hearing, the State effectively
amended the Information by greatly expanding the time of the alleged offense and
presenting evidence at trial that Norcutt allegedly manufactured methamphetamine and
transported clandestine laboratory equipment. Norcutt never waived his right to a
preliminary hearing on these substantial and material changes in the Information and the
trial court erred in refusing to allow a preliminary hearing to go forward in order to
consider whether the State had probable cause to bind him over on these additional
charges.
Norcutt also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence
that he, several years prior to this alleged offense, possessed a notebook containing
recipes for the manufacturing of methamphetamine. This information was too remote in

time to this alleged offense, irrelevant to the charges and unfairly prejudicial, and
therefore, inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Accordingly, Norcutt's conviction should be
reversed.

ARGUMENT

L

NORCUTT'S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY
HEARING WAS VOID AND INEFFECTIVE ONCE THE STATE
MATERIALLY CHANGED THE ALLEGED TIME OF OFFENSE
AND FAILED TO PROVIDE HIM NOTICE THAT IT WOULD
ARGUE AT TRIAL THAT NORCUTT MANUFACTURED
METHAMPHETAMINE AND TRANSPORTED CLANDESTINE
MATERIALS

Norcutt asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his right to a preliminary
hearing where the State was allowed to expand the time of the alleged offense rather than
restricting it and where the State argued at trial a new and different theory of how he
violated Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4 and 58-37d-5. Although Norcutt initially
waived his right to a preliminary hearing, he asserts that his waiver was void and
ineffective once the State effectively amended the Information and argued for the first
time at trial, without notice, that he allegedly manufactured methamphetamine and
transported clandestine laboratory materials. Accordingly, Norcutt's constitutional and
statutory rights were violated since he did not effectively waive his right to a preliminary
hearing.
The Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 13 and Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure afford defendants the right to a preliminary hearing. Moreover, a

"defendant cannot lawfully be tried and convicted on a charge upon which she was not
given, or on which she did not waive a preliminary hearing...." State v. Jensen, 136 P.2d
949, 951-52 (Utah 1943); Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, § 13. Although Norcutt initially
waived the preliminary hearing, this was done before the State effectively amended the
Information and changed its theory on what portion of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4
and 58-37d-5 Norcutt violated. Once the State changed its position, Norcutt's waiver was
ineffective and void and he should have been granted a preliminary hearing.
A.

The State failed to appropriately respond to Norcutt's Demand for
Date, Time and Place of Offense.

Norcutt asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a preliminary
hearing once the State enlarged the alleged date of offense which effectively amounted to
an amendment of the Information.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-14-1 provides: "the prosecuting attorney, on timely
written demand of the defendant, shall within ten days, or such other time as the court
may allow, specify in writing as particularly as is know to him the place, date and time of
the commission of the offense charge." A bill of particulars is "designed to give those
charged sufficient notice to prepare a defense." State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, \ 27,
P.3d

. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has "defined the particularity requirement

as the 'best information5 the prosecution has, and 'whatever information the prosecution
has that may be useful in helping fix a date, time or place of the alleged offense.'" Id.
(citing State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)). "[W]e have held that an
amendment to an information which expands the range of dates for the occurrence of an

alleged offense can implicate substantial rights of a defendant by compromising his
opportunity to present alibi evidence." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^f 20
(citing Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773). Moreover, "due process requires that an accused by
given sufficiently precise notification of the date of the alleged crime so that he can
prepare his defense." Id. "The issue of time may be very important where defendant's
defense is alibi." State v. Cooper, 201 P.2d 764, 769 (Utah 1949). It is evident from case
law that section 77-14-1 is used to pinpoint the date, time and place of offense; it is not a
tool of the State to expand the date in order to circumvent a defendant's alibi. See
Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773.
Norcutt filed a Demand for Date, Time and Place of Offense, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 77-14-1, in order to prepare his defense against the charges (R. 73,
154, 202-05, 211-15). Norcutt also filed a Notice of Alibi, asserting that he was out of
the state from August 13, 2001 through September 26, 2001 (R. 192-93). Rather than
narrow the time frame of the alleged offense, the State enlarged the date of offense from
on or about September 26, 2001, to be between January 1, 2001 and September 26, 2001
(R. 3, 166).
As a result of the State's enlargement of the alleged date of offense, Norcutt filed a
Motion in Limine requesting the trial court to prevent the State from introducing any
evidence of alleged criminal conduct on the part of Norcutt which is alleged prior to
September 26, 2001 (R. 210). Norcutt also filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing,
asserting that the expansion of the date of the alleged offense constituted a major
deviation from the alleged date in the Information, thereby making his previous waiver

ineffective and void (R. 202-05). Norcutt further filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that
the State ignored the bill of particulars and its enlargement of the date of the alleged
offense amounted to an amendment of the Information (R. 212-15).
Norcutt asserts that this amendment to the Information made his prior waiver void
and ineffective since this was a substantial and material change in the charges and
prevented him from effectively using his alibi defense. Moreover, the enlargement of the
date of the alleged offense coupled with the fact that he was charged and tried for
transporting clandestine materials, a crime with which he was not properly noticed,
shows that his waiver was ineffective and void and he should have been granted a
preliminary hearing.
B.

The State impermissibly argued at trial that Norcutt transported
clandestine laboratory materials.

At trial, the State impermissibly presented evidence that Norcutt manufactured
methamphetamine and transported clandestine materials. Norcutt asserts that he was
given insufficient notice to prepare to defend this charge and had he been granted a
preliminary hearing, he would have been adequately prepared to defend against this
charge at trial or the State would have been barred from asserting that he manufactured
methamphetamine or transported clandestine laboratory materials.
In State v. Wilkerson, 612 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court spelled
out the purpose of pleadings in a complaint of information. The Court stated that the
purpose
is to put the defendant on notice as to the contents of the offense and the date
thereof: however, this Court has held that the time or date of the offense may or

may not be a critical element for conviction. In State v. Cooper, we held that what
is critical is not the precise date and time, but that the act with which defendant
was charged was sufficiently identified and singled out by the locus of the offense,
and the particular circumstances surrounding it.
Id. at 366. Moreover, in State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 n.8 (Utah 1978), the Court
held that fairness and due process of the law require the information to clearly state the
charge "in order for the defendant to prepare an adequate defense." Thus, the
Information must at least place the defendant on notice of what he is being charged with
and his acts must be sufficiently identified so the defendant can adequately prepare a
defense.
Norcutt asserts that he was denied his right to due process of law where the State
failed to provide him sufficient notice that it intended to present evidence that he
allegedly manufactured methamphetamine and transported clandestine laboratory
equipment. The Information stated only that Norcutt was charged with violating Utah
Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4 and 58-37d-5. These sections are very broad and include a
wide range of prohibited conduct, including possession of a precursor, possession of
laboratory equipment, distribution or supplying of laboratory equipment or supplies,
engaging in clandestine laboratory operation, manufacturing methamphetamine,
transporting methamphetamine, including numerous enhancement provisions.
While the Information provided general notice that Norcutt was being charged
with violating some aspect of these sections, the Information did not provide Norcutt with
sufficient notice of the alleged "act with which defendant was charged" which would be
"sufficiently identified and singled out by the locus of the offense, and the particular

circumstances surrounding it." Wilkerson, 612 P.2d at 366. However, the Probable Cause
Statement alerted Norcutt to the fact that the State would be charging him for possessing
clandestine laboratory equipment and precursors on or about September 26, 2001 (R. 46). Moreover, the discovery provided by the State alerted Norcutt that the State had
evidence only of alleged possession of clandestine laboratory equipment and precursors.
Additionally, in the State's responses to Norcutt's motions, the State limited its
arguments to the theory that Norcutt possessed clandestine laboratory equipment and
precursors; the State failed to alert Norcutt that they would also present evidence of
manufacturing methamphetamine or transporting clandestine laboratory materials (R.
166,216-19,220-22,223-25).
Norcutt waived his right to a preliminary hearing because he had a valid alibi
defense to the charges that he was on notice of, i.e. that he allegedly possessed
clandestine laboratory equipment and precursors on or about September 26, 2001. In
fact, Norcutt wras in jail in Wyoming at that time and could not have committed the crime
as charged in the Information and Probable Cause Statement (R. 423: 99).
Once Norcutt filed his Notice of Alibi and bill of particulars, the State
significantly enlarged the alleged date of offense to a period covering nine months (R.
166). Then, for the first time at trial, the State argued that Norcutt was involved in
manufacturing methamphetamine and transporting clandestine laboratory materials from
Wyoming to Utah (R. 423: 14-17, 18, 42, 26, 148, 175). Despite numerous motions for
discovery, the State never revealed to Norcutt that Hale informed the police or prosecutor
that Norcutt allegedly manufactured methamphetamine or transported clandestine

laboratory equipment (R. 14-17, 89-90, 150-52). Once the State presented evidence that
Norcutt manufactured methamphetamine and transported clandestine laboratory
equipment, trial counsel moved for a mistrial asserting that the State had failed to provide
this evidence in discovery (R. 423: 39-52).
The facts of this case graphically illustrate why the State's enlargement of the date
of alleged offense and its failure to give Norcutt notice that it would prosecute him for
additional crimes violates Norcutt's substantial rights. This material change in the
Information, coupled with the State's failure to apprise Norcutt that it would present
evidence that he allegedly manufactured methamphetamine and transported laboratory
equipment, constituted a new and different charge which he had no notice of and to
which he had not waived his right to a preliminary hearing on.
It is evident that if Norcutt originally had a preliminary hearing, and at the hearing
the State only presented evidence that he was in possession of clandestine laboratory
equipment and he was bound over only upon that charge, the State could not present
evidence at trial mat he manufactured methamphetamine and transported clandestine
laboratory equipment. If the State attempted to present evidence regarding
manufacturing or transporting, such evidence would surely violate the standard in Jensen,
where the Court held that a "defendant cannot lawfully be tried and convicted on a charge
upon which she was not given, or on which she did not waive a preliminary hearing...."
136 P.2d at 951-52.
Norcutt's waiver was based on the alleged date of offense being on September 26,
2001 and that he was being charged with possessing clandestine laboratory equipment

and precursors. At the time of the waiver, Norcutt was not charged with manufacturing
methamphetamine or transporting clandestine laboratory equipment and precursors.
Therefore, Norcutt never waived his right to a preliminary trial on these issues. Norcutt
timely filed a motion for a preliminary hearing and trial court abused its discretion for
denying that motion. Accordingly, Norcutt's conviction should be reversed.

H.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE THAT NORCUTT,
SEVERAL YEARS PRIOR TO THIS ALLEGED OFFENSE,
POSSESSED A NOTEBOOK CONTAINING RECIPES FOR
COOKING METHAMPHETAMINE

Norcutt asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that
he once possessed a notebook containing methamphetamine recipes several years prior to
this alleged offense. Such evidence was too remote in time to the alleged commission of
this offense, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial and, therefore, inadmissible under Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the trial court failed to "scrupulously"
examine the prior bad acts evidence before it was admitted. Had this evidence been
properly excluded, Norcutt would have received a more favorable outcome.
Accordingly, Norcutt requests ihat his conviction be reversed.
This Court reviews trial court determinations regarding the admissibility of other
crimes evidence or prior bad acts for abuse of discretion. State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT
App 158, Tfll, 72 P3d 127; see State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^{18, 993 P.2d 837, cert
denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000). When analyzing the
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court must determine cc(l) whether the

evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character purpose under 404(b), (2) whether
such evidence meets the requirements of 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the
requirements of 403." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^[20). "However, in the proper exercise of
that discretion, trial judges must 'scrupulously' examine the evidence before it is
admitted." Tif. at 118.
A.

Evidence of Norcutt's Prior Bad Acts was Inadmissible under Rule
404(b)

Under the standard set forth in Decorso, the State "must demonstrate that the
evidence is actually being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." 1999 UT 57 at \
21. Before the evidence is admitted, the trial court must "scrupulously" examine the
evidence to ensure its admission is proper. Id, at \ 18.
Norcutt asserts that the State failed to show that the evidence was only being
offered for a proper, non-character purpose and the trial court failed to "scrupulously"
examine the evidence to ensure it was offered for proper reasons. The State merely
asserted that Norcutt's prior possession of a notebook containing methamphetamine
recipes was proof of a plan and intent to actually possess a clandestine lab (R. 306; R.
422: 8). And the trial court only mentioned that "this case [] seems to me that it's clearly
one of those plans or motive exceptions because of the dispute maybe here about who
owned it and who was the cook" (R. 422: 10). The trial court also stated, "Even though it
was two years old, there's enough of a connection for the element of plan, motive,
absence of mistake, and so on" (R. 422: 11). The trial court's mere recital of portions of

Rule 404(b) does not comport with standard that before prior bad acts evidence is
admitted, it must be "scrupulously" examined.
Moreover, the mere fact that Norcutt had in his possession, two years before this
alleged offense, a notebook containing methamphetamine recipes is insufficient evidence
to support the trial court's finding that'this is proof of intent and a plan to possess a
clandestine lab under Rule 404(b). Possession of this notebook was certainly not illegal
and there was no indication from Troy Vincent that Norcutt intended or planned to use
the notebook to cook methamphetamine (R. 423: 62). Furthermore, there was no
evidence, besides the self-serving testimony of Lindsay Hale, to suggest that Norcutt had
some "plan" to cook methamphetamine. While it is true that some lab items were found
in Norcutt's bus, those items were put there by Hale after Norcutt was in jail (R. 422: 85,
89; 121; R. 423: 81, 85-86). Thus, it was a gigantic leap for the trial court to assume that
mere possession of recipes tends to prove that Norcutt had a plan to possess precursor
materials as well as a clandestine lab.
Norcutt asserts that if the trial court properly examined the evidence, it would have
found that the notebook was insufficient evidence of a plan to possess a clandestine lab or
precursors. Had the trial court not abused its discretion, Norcutt would have received a
more favorable outcome.
B.

The Notebook Evidence Was Too Remote In Time to be Relevant

If this Court finds that the evidence was admissible for Rule 404(b) purposes,
Norcutt asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence
because it was irrelevant to the crime charged and the trial court failed to make any

findings regarding Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Law enforcement found the
notebook two years prior to the alleged commission of this offense, and this lengthy time
period is too remote in time to be a "fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable ... than it would be without the evidence." Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 401.
While "[rjemoteness usually goes to the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility.... the trial judge should consider any reduction in the probative value
resulting from the remoteness of the prior incident." Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile
Inst, 605 P.2d 314, 323 n. 30 (Utah 1979); overruled on other grounds, McFarland, v.
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
"Our case law has also made it clear that '[ejvidence is not admitted merely
because it shows a common plan, scheme, or manner of operation. Instead, evidence of a
common plan, scheme, or manner of operation is admitted [only] where it tends to prove
some fact material to the crime charged.5 Thus we reaffirm that unless the other crimes
evidence tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged — other than the
defendant's propensity to commit crime — it is irrelevant and should be excluded by the
court pursuant to rule 402." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^[22 (citation omitted, emphasis in
original).
In this case, the trial court failed to make findings on whether the evidence was
relevant and failed to make any findings on what effect the remoteness of the evidence
had on the relevancy and probative value (R. 422: 5-11). Moreover, whether Norcutt had
methamphetamine recipes in a notebook in 1999 carries little relevancy as to whether he

possessed clandestine lab materials two years later. This proves only that Norcutt had
recipes in his possession two years before the alleged offense; it is not relevant to
whether he possessed the lab items in 2001. This evidence certainly does not tend to
prove that he possessed the items as charged. Accordingly, the trial court abused its
discretion for admitting the irrelevant evidence and for failing to make any findings on
the record regarding relevancy.
C.

The Notebook Evidence Was Highly Prejudicial and Not Probative

Norcutt asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because the notebook
evidence was highly prejudicial and its probative value, if any, was substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice. Rule 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403.
"In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters must be considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Decorso', 1999 UT 57
at Tf29 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)).

First, Norcutt asserts that the evidence linking him to the clandestine lab items was
based solely on the testimony of Lindsay Hale, as admitted by Detective Hollebeke (R.
422: 130). During Hale's first interview with the police, after the police had searched her
home and placed her under arrest for possession of a clandestine lab and precursors as
well as possession of paraphernalia, Hale failed to implicate Norcutt in the matter (R.
422: 114-15). In fact, it was only after Hale spent the night in jail did she implicate
Norcutt (R. 422: 123). Although Hale admitted that she attempted to cook
methamphetamine with the equipment and that she placed the items in Norcutt's bus (R.
422: 121, 123, 123), she agreed to testify against Norcutt "As long as I am not charged
for it" (R. 422: 129-30). Moreover, Hale admitted that she repeatedly lied to the police
about her methamphetamine use in order to make herself look better (R. 423: 30-31).
Thus, the evidence linking Norcutt to the crime was based solely on an unreliable
witness.
Second, possessing a notebook containing recipes for cooking methamphetamine
is not necessarily related to possessing a clandestine lab and precursors. It is no crime to
possess these recipes and possession of recipes is certainly not proof of an intent or plan
to produce methamphetamine. Moreover, two years had passed between the time Norcutt
possessed the notebook and this alleged offense occurred.
Third, it was unnecessary to present this evidence, considering the remoteness in
time and the fact that the State had a witness supporting its theory. Furthermore, any
probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Allowing the jury to hear evidence that Norcutt had at one point in his life
possessed recipes for producing methamphetamine would confuse and mislead the jury
and rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. Manufacturing illegal drugs is rightly
unacceptable in our community and admitting evidence that Norcutt once possessed
recipes on producing methamphetamine with the inference that he did in fact produce the
substance with those recipes unfairly prejudiced Norcutt. This inference certainly led the
jury to believe that Norcutt was a person of low moral character and that if he possessed
recipes, then he has a propensity to commit crime and produce illegal drugs. This
inference would certainly mislead and confuse the jury as to the issues properly before it:
whether Norcutt possessed the materials found by the police on September 26, 2001.
Moreover, it would likely inflame the jury or incite overmastering hostility toward him
due to the strong community standard against the manufacturing of illegal drugs.
Norcutt also asserts that the trial court failed to make any findings on the record
regarding the probative versus unfair prejudicial value of the evidence (R. 422: 5-11).
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Norcutt's motion in limine,
and absent such abuse, Norcutt would have received a more favorable outcome.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Norcutt asks this Court to reverse his conviction and
remand this case to the trial court for a new hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February, 2005.

Michael D. Esplin
Counsel for Appellant
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58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory equipment, or laboratory
supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor
Act, or the regulations issued under that act, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the
material distributed or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or manufacture a controlled or
counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act;
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the intent to distribute or to be
distributed by the person transporting or conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any
other person regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within this state or any
other location; or
(h) engage in compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, extraction, or other
physical or chemical processing of any substance, including a controlled substance precursor, or the
packaging, repackaging, labeling, or relabeling of a container holding a substance that is a product of
any of these activities, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the substance is a product of
any of these activities and will be used in the illegal manufacture of specified controlled substances.
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second degree felony.
Amended by Chapter 90, 2004 General Session
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58-37d-5. Prohibited acts -- First degree felony.
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b)5 (e), (f), or (h) is guilty of a first degree
felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following conditions occurred in conjunction with that
violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or while
transporting or causing to be transported materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation,
there was created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500 feet of a residence,
place of business, church, or school;
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a specified controlled
substance; or
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of cocaine base or
methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in Subsections (l)(a) through
(f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall not be granted;
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense.
Amended by Chapter 115, 2003 General Session
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77-14-1. Time and place of alleged offense ~ Specification.
The prosecuting attorney, on timely written demand of the defendant, shall within ten days, or such
other time as the court may allow, specify in writing as particularly as is known to him the place, date
and time of the commission of the offense charged.
Enacted by Chapter 15, 1980 General Session

Utah Code Section Article I, Section 13
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Article I, Section 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the
consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The
formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 CO_02014.ZIP 1,778 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title]All TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised: Tuesday, December 21, 2004
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Rule 6. Warrant of arrest or summons.
(a) Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a summons for
the appearance of the accused.
Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the information, or from any affidavit filed with the information, that
there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has committed it, the
magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a summons for the appearance of the accused.
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the accused will appear on a summons and there is no substantial danger of a
breach of the peace, or injury to persons or property, or danger to the community, a summons may issue in lieu of a
warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the accused, if the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue. A
warrant of arrest may issue in cases where the defendant has failed to appear in response to a summons or citation or
thereafter when required by the court. When a warrant of arrest is issued, the magistrate shall state on the warrant:
(1) the amount of bail; and
(2) if the magistrate determines that the accused must appear in court, the name of the law enforcement agency in the
county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(c) (1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace officer. The summons may be served by a peace officer or any
person authorized to serve a summons in a civil action.
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at any place within the state.
(3) The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest, but upon request shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as practicable.
If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of
the offense charged and of the fact that the warrant has been issued. The summons shall be served as in civil actions,
or by mailing it to the defendant's last known address.
(4) The person executing a warrant or serving a summons shall make return thereof to the magistrate as soon as
practicable. At the request of the prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the magistrate for
cancellation.
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but
the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to prove or disprove the existence of any "material
fact" Avoiding the use of the term "matenai fact" accords with the application given to former Rule 1 (2) by the Utah
Supreme Court State v Peterson, 560 P 2d 1387 (Utah 1977)
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word "statute" the words
"Constitution of the United States" have been added.
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
except that "surpnse" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The change in language is not one
of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403 See also
Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more
appropriate method of dealing with "surprise " See also Smith v Estelle, 445 F Supp 647 (N D Tex 1977) (surprise
use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the following Utah
cases to the same effect Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), State v Johns, 615 P 2d
1260 (Utah 1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2d 93 (Utah 1982)

Rule 404
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Advisory Committee Note B Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the
notice provisions already in the federal rule, add the amendments made to the federal rule effective December 1, 2000,
and delete language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. However, the deletion of that language is not intended to
reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b)
must also conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible.

